Briefing Charts Redux

I keep coming back to this topic of presentations. I really think that if we could just have the guts, imagination and will to improve the way we give presentations, we'd find that we could fix all sorts of other problems. If we would spend the time necessary to communicate clearly & accurately, and if we valued telling the truth over making sure the charts are consistent with everyone else's format, not only would a lot of problems be easier to solve - I think many wouldn't even occur in the first place.

But it's tricky, isn't it? If your charts don't look as dense, complex and convoluted as everyone else's, it'll look like you didn't really do any work, 'cause everyone knows complexity is a sign of effort, right? Actually, a simple, clear message takes more understanding, more time and more skill than the jumbled messes we call "finished products."

So, to help get things started, here are a few thoughts and guidelines, in case you haven't picked up Garr Reynolds' Presentation Zen yet:

1) You don't need your logo on every chart. Honest!

2) You don't need a redundant title on each chart either. Really, you don't!

3) Use hand-outs to present details. Use PowerPoint charts to present main topics

4) Limit yourself to somewhere between 1/2 an idea and 1 full idea per chart.

5) Time is always (always always always) the limiting factor (the only limiting factor). It's not about how many charts you use.

It's Not Inevitable

OK, let me summarize the whole FIST thing as concisely as possible. It really comes down to this:

"There is nothing inherent in military technology that requries it to cost so much, take so long, or be so complex."

There, I wrote it down for everybody on the Interwebs to see, and it feels good.

The more I read, the more I do, the more I hear people's stories, the more convinced I am that complexity is not inevitable. We do it to ourselves, technologically and organizationally and procedurally... but we dont' have to. Similarly, these huge cost overruns and schedule delays are not inevitable. Until we believe that - I mean REALLY believe it - we're going to keep getting the results we've been getting.

Incidentally, this applies to NASA's space projects as much as the DoD's systems... and no doubt to commercial & industrial projects as well.

Contracting Fail

I recently came across this post from Cliff at the Sunlight Labs blog, talking about their failed attempt to bid for a government contract (thanks to Dick for the link!). I say "their failed bid," but in fact I think it's more like the government's failure to get their bid. The current government environment is so insular, jargon-heavy and complex that a new company ends up facing all sorts of unnecessary barriers. Sunlight Labs ended up not even submitting their proposal.

But that's a discussion for another day.

What I want to comment on is their attitude to the whole thing. They looked at it as a learning and growing opportunity. They looked at it as a failure, yes, but a head-held-high kind of failure. Something to reflect on, learn from, and discuss with a wider community. They even acknowledged that, as it turns out, the project they'd planned to bid on was probably too big for their organization to effectively achieve. Now that is clearheaded humility and insightful self-awareness.

Their experience definitely gave me something to think about. I love their story, and I love the way Cliff tells it. And so we award Sunlight Labs the coveted Rogue Medal of Awesomeness.

F-22 RIP (?)

With the Senate's recent decision to not fund additional F-22's, I'd like to take a moment to say, with as much respect and propriety as possible, WOO-HOO!

Ahem.

And I was also thinking that now might be a good time to highlight some of the reasons it's a good idea to not spend more money on the Raptor.

1) The SECDEF, SECAF and CSAF don't want more. In fact, the Secretary and Chief wrote an OpEd in which they said it's "time to move on."

2) Despite going operational in Dec 2005, the F-22 has yet to fly a single combat mission in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Where is it flying? Alaska - where it (ironically) performs the mission that was envisioned for it back in 1981: keeping the Russians away. Yes, I suppose that's important, but hardly the top priority for today's DoD... or tomorrow's... or the day after that...

3) It's too expensive and has all sorts of maintenance problems (both of which probably contribute to #2).

Ultimately, I think the problem with the F-22 is that we've spent too much time and money on it. We made it too complicated (both operationally & technically). The end result is technically obsolete and operationally irrelevant (for example, it can't share data). Did you know we started the F-22 Upgrade program BEFORE it went operational? Um, shouldn't we at least start flying it before we upgrade it? [note: I can't put my hands on the link to support that statement at the moment, but lemme know if you want it & I'll track it down.]

If we'd focused on simplicity and insisted on budget & schedule restraints, we might have ended up with a system that was Affordable, Available when needed and Effective when used.

Instead, we ended up with one that's hugely expensive, not available on time and not suited to the military's needs. And did I mention it can't share the intel it collects (except with other F-22's)?

The lesson for the rest of the world is pretty clear. A lack of restraint, an infatuation with complexity and a dependence on political support to keep the project alive leads down a dark and ugly road.

Rogue Project Leaders take note. Rogue projects are generally quick, inexpensive, simple and unloved and/or ignored by the Powers That Be... and that's a good thing.