Boyd on CyberWar

The hacking (cracking) attack on Google et al has caused a phenomenon that actually puts those companies and even countries at risk. Over the last year, the response by companies and countries to these cracking episodes has been to lock down their intranet/internet systems, filtering content and making access more restrictive. As an example, the Air Force Material Command, even after relenting on bans with certain types of social media, still enacts a robust filtering policy that continues to restrict blogs, wikis, and the like. Australia is even considering filtering incoming internet traffic echoing China and other totalitarian countries.

The giant risk of this fortress mentality is that it actually makes the organization less secure because it makes the organization less nimble. By enacting more security, an organization inevitably enacts more bureaucracy which creates friction and slows reaction ability to a grinding halt. This phenomenon is captured well in the Starfish and the Spider (I synopsize it here) and was a central tenet in John Boyd’s discussions on how armies win wars. I propose that rather than locking down access to the internet, organizations relinquish control and let employees, partners, and other supporter’s route crackers and malcontents via an organic set of decentralized tactics (this may already be taking place). Twitter is indeed mission critical. In cyber operations, observing, orienting, and acting faster than the adversary is the only way win.

Rethinking the Principles of Program Management

Some interesting concepts that come out of asymmetrical warfare strategy talk to the importance of taking advantage of opportunity and agility in maneuvering against an enemy. Often, these principles are linked to the conduct of war as an art form. As an art form, principles devised to guide conduct are not considered immutable or inviolable. One author even states,

The crucial element of its artistic application is recognizing unique contexts, the contingent factors, and the opportunities to create advantage purposely by violating principles or rules when needed. [A]rt accepts the existence of principles and rules, but only as guides. Each case has its own features - which modify the application of the rule, and may even make it at times wholly inapplicable.

- Frank Hoffman, Chap 17, Rethinking the principles of War, Naval institute Press, Oct 2005

If this applies to the messy work of warfare, why not program management? Isn't program management as much an art form as warfare? I think so. Yet too often (if not exclusively), the same defense department that conducts war treats the business of weapons technology development as a precise science to be quantified, measured, predicted and proven. This behavior is as if the human factor of "business" doesn't exist. But it does and with it comes the art of business. A craft that can't be accounted for by implementing rigid processes or precise controls. The artistic practice of business allows for unknowns and flexes to let humans use their ingenuity to solve problems rather than forcing them to stick strictly to the script. The artistic practice of business is attuned to serendipity.

Removing an over reliance on process and procedure is one step toward practicing the craft. Increasing tolerance of failure and allowing deviant practices as a matter of course are others. Anything that puts people back into the drivers seat of business - that's how to practice the art of business.